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Abstract
A single narrative about the Gorongosa Restoration Project (GRP) in Mozambique circulates widely in the popular 
media. This story characterises the project as an innovative intervention into an ecological crisis situation. The narrative 
hails the project’s aim to use profits from tourism to address the goals of both human development and conservation 
of biodiversity, and portrays the park project as widely embraced by long-term residents. This representation helps 
the project attract broad acclaim, donor funding, and socially conscious visitors, yet it obscures the early emergence 
of unified opposition to the project’s interventions among long-term residents of Gorongosa Mountain. This article 
draws on ethnographic research conducted on Gorongosa Mountain between 2006 and 2008 to examine the project’s 
early activities there. I examine two crisis narratives that led to entrenched conflict between park-based actors and 
mountain residents. Focusing on the emergence and solidification of divergent narratives—narrative fortresses—about 
the extension of the park’s activities to Gorongosa Mountain offers insight into the powerful role of crisis narratives 
in producing and maintaining conflict, leading to outcomes counter to the desires of conservationists. Ultimately, 
the article points to ways in which narratives of environmental crisis work against aspirations of partnership and 
collaboration with resident populations in conservation and development schemes.
Keywords: conservation, narrative, community, crisis, land, conflict, sustainable development, Gorongosa 
National Park, Mozambique
INTRODUCTION
A single narrative about the Gorongosa Restoration Project
(GRP) in Gorongosa National Park (GNP) has gained widespread
circulation in the popular media. This story characterises the
project as an innovative conservation and development success
story in the making—a win-win combination that is celebrated 
by conservation biologists, Mozambican government officials, 
foreign tourists, and long term Gorongosa residents. However, 
this feel-good story belies a much more complex situation on 
the ground, including animosity and conflict between residents 
of Gorongosa Mountain and park actors. In order to better 
understand the nature and emergence of this heated and ongoing 
conflict, this article analyses how crisis figured in narratives that 
oriented differently positioned actors. Key to understanding the 
conflict is how crisis claims in both sets of narratives produced 
rigid positions—what I will refer to as ‘narrative fortresses’—
where possibilities of compromise or collaboration were 
foreclosed, ultimately leading to outcomes counter to the desires 
of both conservationists and mountain residents. Analysis of 
crisis narratives in this conflict suggests that conservation 
and development schemes motivated primarily by stories 
of environmental crisis may be fundamentally incompatible 
with aspirations for collaboration or partnership with resident 
populations.
Below, I examine different narratives that circulated from 
2005 to 2008, related to conservation and management 
activities in GNP. During this period, interventions to 
rehabilitate GNP were managed and conducted through Greg 
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Carr’s1 philanthropic organisation, The Gregory C. Carr 
Foundation2 and included significant efforts to extend park 
management and tourism activities to Gorongosa Mountain 
which, at the time, lay more than 20 km outside the boundaries 
of GNP. From the very first interaction between park actors and 
mountain residents in early 2006, the Carr Foundation’s desire 
to incorporate Gorongosa Mountain into its conservation and 
development project was met with significant opposition. At 
this time, two crisis narratives, one figuring mountain residents 
as a threat to the ecology of the mountain and hence the region, 
the other figuring the park and its representatives as threatening 
outsiders hungry for land, came into conflict, and, like oil and 
water, repelled each other and remained separate.
Numerous scholars of conservation and development projects 
have observed how narratives emerge in conflicts over land and 
resources (Peters 1994; Fortmann 1995; Leach and Mearns 
1996; Campbell 2002; Hutton et al. 2005; Dressler et al. 2010). 
As discursive strategies, such narratives often emerge as ways 
to define and claim resources (Peters 1994; Fortmann 1995). 
Louise Fortmann has argued that narratives should be seen not 
only as statements or claims, but also as “a medium through 
which… events are produced” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). She 
identifies how, in the context of land disputes, stories serve as 
discursive strategies that do at least three kinds of work: “to 
create meaning and validate action; to mobilise action; and to 
define alternatives” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). This article builds 
on this work, drawing added attention to how evaluations 
of crisis and convictions of urgency contribute to a type of 
intractable conflict that frequently emerges in conservation and 
development projects. 
Drawing on Janet Roitman’s examination of the power and 
prevalence of the notion of ‘crisis’ in both popular and academic 
thought (Roitman 2013), I focus attention on understanding 
“the kinds of work the term ‘crisis’ is or is not doing in the 
construction of narrative forms” (Roitman 2013: 3). From this 
perspective, the goal here is not to evaluate the relative truth or 
falsity of the crisis narratives I will discuss below, but rather 
to examine how differently positioned actors’ evaluations of 
crisis shaped early interactions between Carr Foundation actors 
and their supporters and mountain residents, producing an 
immediate and enduring conflict. As Roitman demonstrates, 
crisis “regulates narrative constructions… [allowing] certain 
questions to be asked while others are foreclosed” (Roitman 
2013: 94), and “[evokes] a moral demand for a difference 
between past and the future” (Roitman 2013: 8). Indeed, in 
the case of Gorongosa Mountain, the moral demands inherent 
in different narratives of threats to land and resources on 
the mountain led differently positioned actors to relinquish 
opportunities for negotiation or compromise, narrowing the 
range for potential actions and leading actors on either side 
of the conflict to transgress norms when faced with obstacles. 
A central focus in my analysis is examination of the ways 
in which differently positioned actors’ profoundly different 
understandings of threats to land and resources on Gorongosa 
Mountain became rigidly divided. For actors on both sides of 
the conflict that emerged about Gorongosa Mountain, crisis 
claims intensified feelings of uncertainty about the future of the 
land on the mountain. The element of urgency central to these 
narratives led to hardened positions that shaped interpretations 
of and responses to the other side’s words and actions, making 
positions on either side quite inflexible. My term ‘fortress 
narratives’ is shorthand to describe this situation, which 
plays on the term ‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington 2002). 
While, currently, with thousands of human inhabitants, the 
GNP’s extension to include portions of Gorongosa Mountain 
is not an example of ‘fortress conservation,’ in fact, tight 
fortification of information and thick barriers to the affected 
residents’ real involvement in park planning or decision making 
have created narrative fortresses impermeable to change or 
influence. My use of the term ‘fortress narratives’ also points 
to the connections between divergent understandings of threats 
to land and resources, and the production of fortress-style 
management practices in conservation programmes.
METHODOLOGY
This research draws on over five years spent living in 
Gorongosa District. For three and a half of these years I was 
conducting ethnographic research split between Gorongosa 
Mountain, in an area that is inside the newly designated 
boundary to the GNP, and in the district capital. While the 
Mozambican government announced their official decision 
to expand the park’s boundaries to include the area above 
700 meters on the mountain in 2010, after the initial period of 
this research, the possibility of this expansion raised the spectre 
of dispossession for mountain residents throughout the main 
research period (2006-2008).
Given the long-term nature of my involvement in the 
region, my research methods have varied. A primary aspect 
of my methodology has been residence and participation 
in daily life on Gorongosa Mountain. The main period of 
research (2006-2008) builds upon relationships, language 
skills, and research conducted in previous stays from late 
1998 through 2001, and during the June-August academic 
breaks of 2003 and 2004. Between mid-2006 and mid-2008 I 
conducted research on economic and religious transformations 
in the district (Schuetze 2010). During this time I conducted 
countless interviews with differently positioned residents 
of the Khanda régulado3 on the mountain and participated 
in numerous meetings convened by park based actors about 
the park’s planned interventions on Gorongosa Mountain. At 
each of the meetings, I kept detailed field notes, made and 
transcribed digital audio recordings, and when possible,4 made 
video recordings. Most recently, I have resided on Gorongosa 
Mountain in June and July of 2011. All of this work has afforded 
me a long-term view of the area and its transformations.
While my long-term connection to Gorongosa affords 
me privileged insights into the unfolding of Gorongosa 
Park’s relationship with mountain residents from the time 
of Greg Carr’s initial involvement, I also recognise that my 
perspective is more richly informed by research conducted on 
Gorongosa Mountain than it is by deep, long-term ethnographic 
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engagement with members of the park’s leadership based 
primarily in the Chitengo camp inside the park. However, 
I was in contact with members of the Carr Foundation and 
the park leadership beginning in 2005 and maintained this 
communication throughout the course of this research. 
Although my research focused on the lives of mountain 
residents, it is my hope that I am able to highlight aspects of 
both park-based actors’ and mountain residents’ narratives 
about the expansion of the park to Gorongosa Mountain that 
offer greater understandings of both sides of the conflict.
ARGUMENT
A magic bullet for a crisis: a saviour and a gardener of 
Eden
The most widely circulating narrative about GNP is a familiar 
win-win conservation and development success story that has 
gained popular media attention. From the very start, The Carr 
Foundation’s involvement in GNP has attracted a great deal of 
media attention. Greg Carr’s success in business, his subsequent 
status as a millionaire, and his philanthropic ventures have 
served to raise his public prominence and to strengthen the 
authoritative quality of his efforts. His venture into conservation 
has tapped into the magic combination of celebrity and 
environment, allowing him to be counted among a group of 
people Brockington has termed ‘celebrity conservationists,’ 
whose active commitment to environmental causes greatly 
increases their fame and public profile (2009). The narrative 
of Carr’s philanthropic venture has been featured in widely 
circulated glossies such as National Geographic Explorer, 
Forbes, The New Yorker and Outside Magazine. With titles 
such as ‘Gardener of Eden,’ ‘Greg Carr’s Big Gamble,’ ‘The 
Saviour of Gorongosa,’ and ‘Saving a Global Treasure,’ these 
features uniformly present Greg Carr as a heroic protagonist, 
turning Carr into a rock star of conservation philanthropy.5 
A segment titled ‘One Man’s Plan to Save a Natural Treasure’ 
that appeared on the popular CBS6 show, ‘60 Minutes’ on 
October 26, 2008 is representative of this dominant narrative. 
In this segment, the focal point of the story is Carr’s generosity 
to use USD 40 million over a period of 20 years to bring about 
dramatic improvements in both conservation and human 
development in Gorongosa. The segment in the show opens 
with the following statement:
 How much can one man do to save a desperate  
nation? American entrepreneur Greg Carr is finding 
out, throwing himself and much of his fortune into 
one of the poorest places on earth. Mozambique, in 
East Africa, is a country of spectacular beauty, but 
it’s been laid waste by decades of war, by malaria 
and by HIV. It takes a lot of vision to see opportunity 
there, but… Carr thinks he’s found it, in a wildlife 
park called Gorongosa, which he believes could be 
the salvation of a nation, and maybe a model for the 
world.7
The ‘60 Minutes’ narrative portrays Gorongosa as “a tragedy 
in two parts”: the fall of a national park to obscurity from a 
position as the “most popular national park in all of Africa” 
after extensive wildlife loss from war-time poaching; and “the 
suffering of its people whose lives haven’t improved much in 
a few hundred years.”8 With this seemingly hopeless situation 
as the frame, Greg Carr is figured as a hero whose innovative 
plan to bring “entrepreneurship to charity” promises to “bring 
Gorongosa back to what it was.”9 In an interview filmed in the 
park’s Chitengo Camp, Greg Carr states:
  So, the idea is take the beauty of the park and use 
that to do human development. Attract the tourists 
who will spend the money to create the jobs and lift 
everybody outta poverty. For an entrepreneur, it’s 
kind of a compelling opportunity to, you know, one 
plus one equals ten.10
Scott Pelley narrates the segment as he takes a tour of GNP 
and Vinho, a settlement adjacent to the park’s headquarters, 
which has been the location of most of the Carr Foundation’s 
direct human development initiatives. On this tour, Greg 
Carr figures prominently as he guides Pelley—with minor 
parts played by two park employees—the then Park Director 
Baldeu Chande, and the then Director of Community Relations, 
Mateus Mutemba. These people, none of whom are long-term 
residents of Gorongosa, figure as the protagonists in the 
narrative—actors who implement benevolent projects in the 
park and in the neighbouring settlement. Their viewpoints 
from interviews are woven together to contribute to the main 
plot line. 
By contrast, in this portrayal, Gorongosa residents are 
not active protagonists but are represented as an audience 
to the unfolding events and the raw material for directed 
interventions. Footage depicts several shots of malnourished 
children as Scott Pelley cites striking statistics to illustrate the 
severity of poverty in Mozambique. Scenes from Vinho feature 
residents making use of facilities built with Carr Foundation 
funds: students in assembly at the new USD 100,000 school; 
people waiting in line at the new USD 200,000 health clinic; 
and scenes of a community gathering where the narrator notes 
that, “among the villagers Carr is treated like a rock star.”11 
This narrative presents the Carr Foundation’s efforts in a single 
population centre adjacent to the park as emblematic of how 
the project impacts all residents living in and around the park’s 
territory of 4,067 sq. km and a buffer zone of 3,300 sq. km. It 
thus uniformly depicts Gorongosa residents as the silent and 
grateful recipients of Carr’s goodwill.
Like this ‘60 Minutes’ feature, the dominant popular 
narrative of Greg Carr’s involvement in GNP gains widespread 
circulation through the work of the park’s public relations staff. 
The park’s PR Department actively transmits this narrative 
through press releases and a sophisticated website to lure 
both potential donors and prospective visitors. Once visitors 
arrive at the park, this narrative is also transmitted in new 
ways to shape visitors’ experiences. Hospitality staff actively 
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emphasise the ‘beginning’ point of the narrative for park 
visitors by setting up a television in the main restaurant that 
screens vintage videos of the colonial heyday when vast herds 
of water buffalo, zebra, and antelope of all sorts gathered at 
Lake Urema during the dry season. 
Having depicted the colonial past as a glorious one, the 
dominant GNP narrative then highlights a present situation 
of crisis (the combined challenges of depleted wildlife 
and the poverty of area residents), and the imagined future 
restoration of the park’s former glory through the salvation of 
a “restoration project” which will both rejuvenate tourism and 
serve as an “engine of economic growth for the entire region.”12 
This narrative has wide appeal because of the apparent 
plausibility of a simple solution, the absence of conflict, and 
its heart-warming content. 
In these popular stories, crisis functions to garner praise 
and support for a worthy and benevolent cause and creates a 
sense of ‘history in the making’—a crucial moment in time 
which prompts potential visitors to desire to see the progress 
first hand. Conflict and complicated realities are edited out of 
this popular version of the story—allowing it to retain its wide 
appeal. But, such popular narratives that figure Carr as a hero 
bringing uniformly positive benefits to eager recipients belie 
a much more complicated situation on the ground. 
Where is the ‘crisis’?: the persuasive power of narratives 
of environmental degradation
The ‘60 Minutes’ segment and other features on the GRP 
offer an abbreviated view into what has been a much more 
expansive effort to rehabilitate GNP. From the very start, a 
significant focus of the Carr Foundation’s involvement in GNP 
has been to extend the boundaries of the park to include the 
upper elevations of Gorongosa Mountain. In this context, the 
dominant narrative is a powerful depiction of an environmental 
crisis that was circulated to generate financial support and 
public approval for the park’s expansion. Examining this 
narrative in greater detail reveals the deeply persuasive power 
of crisis narratives in conservation and development projects.
After an aerial tour of GNP that also included Gorongosa 
Mountain in September 2005, Greg Carr and American 
ecologist Rich Beilfuss became alarmed at fires and deforested 
areas on the mountain’s slopes. After this helicopter tour, Carr 
concluded urgently, “colleagues of mine who are scientists 
believe that the mountain top will be mostly destroyed in a 
very few years if something is not done.”13 Thus, in one brief 
sentence, a narrative was put forward, legitimated by the 
authoritative knowledge of ‘scientists,’ and creating a sense of 
urgency for something ‘to be done.’ Two days later Beilfuss, 
the then head of the Carr Foundation’s new Gorongosa Park 
Research Station,14 stated that their “strategy to deal with 
the problem” would “involve efforts to entice people off 
the mountain with some sort of settled, irrigated household 
schemes in the lowlands below 2,000 feet.”15 
The contours of this narrative quickly gained more detail, 
more solid grounding in authoritative knowledge, and clearer 
definition for paths of action to take. Beilfuss and other 
Carr Foundation staff soon undertook “preliminary studies” 
including six helicopter transects, a “nine-day ground visit 
with residents and land users on the mountain,” and “analysis 
of change using satellite imagery” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 2). 
A report of findings from this rapid assessment was released 
in December 2005, and declared that the mountain was 
“under immediate threat” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 1) and that 
“slash-and-burn encroachment and uncontrolled fire escaping 
from hunting or clearing, are the two main destructive forces 
behind the loss of the forest ecosystem” (Beilfuss et al. 
2005: 5). Less than four months from the initial observations, 
the authors presented their findings, arguing that, “the rate 
and extent of land clearing on the Gorongosa Mountain is 
accelerating rapidly” and that “it will take no more than three 
to five years before the ecosystem is degraded to a point from 
which it is unlikely to recover” (Carr Foundation 2006: 10). 
At this time, the Carr Foundation funded the production and 
circulation of a sophisticated video titled ‘Save the Mountain’ 
in order to generate awareness of and support for their efforts. 
After receiving the reports myself, I was anxious to return 
and see the situation first hand. Having lived on the upper 
elevations of the mountain in 2004, I was concerned about 
what sounded like an alarming situation for people I knew 
personally. Given the inflammatory language of the Carr 
Foundation’s 2005 ‘Save the Mountain’ public campaign, 
when I returned to stay on the Khanda portion of the mountain 
in 2006, I expected to now be able to see in person what the 
video and reports described as ‘denuded hillsides’ above my 
host family’s fields. But as I gazed up at the top of the mountain 
that loomed over my host family’s home, the dark edge of 
the montane rainforest looked just as it had two years before. 
There was no sign of crisis, no visible clear cuts, and no barren 
hillsides as Greg Carr’s emails had led me to imagine. The 
fields here were just as they had been since I began visiting 
the area in 1999.
The surprise I felt on my return resulted from one of the 
effects of prevalent and globally circulating environmental 
crisis narratives. Though I knew of residents’ complex 
agricultural, fire control, and land management systems 
from previous stays on the mountain, the characterisation 
of crisis in authoritative technical language and through 
high quality media appealed to powerful universal ideas 
(Tsing 2005)—ideas so potent that I was led to expect that 
the situation on the mountain had made a sudden change for 
the worse. The Carr Foundation’s reports of the situation in 
Gorongosa had overwhelmed my own grounded knowledge 
of the people and place of Gorongosa that came from more 
than three years of living in the district.
Part of the power of environmental crisis narratives comes 
from their tendency to simplify complex situations into 
familiar and recognizable stories. Examining the emergence 
of the park’s crisis narrative of ecological collapse on the 
mountain illustrates this aspect well. When Greg Carr and other 
members of his foundation’s team first made aerial visits to the 
mountain in 2005, they incorporated their observations into 
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pre-existing narrative frameworks, linking brief observations 
into a complete vision of the nature of the situation. As has 
been noted elsewhere in Africa regarding the creation of land 
and resource policy, Carr and his team of scientists inferred 
sweeping crisis from casual ‘snapshot’ observations (Fairhead 
and Leach 1996). Aerial views that were literally detached 
from both social context and time depth perspective became 
the basis for formulating a vision of the scale and speed 
of deforestation despite weak empirical evidence.16 Carr 
Foundation scientists’ readings of the Gorongosa Mountain 
landscape are likely to have been further skewed since they 
made their primary observations during the end of the dry 
season (September-October) when many people set fires as 
part of the regular agricultural cycle and to create fire breaks 
around homesteads surrounded by dense, tall grasses. As 
Leach and Mearns have noted, a common methodological 
error in scientific assessments of environmental degradation in 
Africa has been “to take short-run observations as evidence of 
a secular long-run trend, when they may simply describe one 
phase in a cycle” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 15).
This example also reveals another key aspect of the power 
of crisis narratives in this context—their influence on how 
one interprets evidence and experience. The fact that such a 
rapid assessment led so quickly to definitive explanations and 
prescriptions for action, including ideas for massive ‘voluntary’ 
resettlement schemes for mountain residents, reveals how, 
beginning in 2005, Carr Foundation staff made sense of 
the situation in Gorongosa drawing on wider discourses or 
what Leach and Mearns refer to as “received wisdom about 
environmental change” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 3). Indeed, 
Carr Foundation scientists’ narrative of crisis depends on and 
perpetuates a conventional view, that African agriculturalists 
are “incapable of acting as resource custodians” (Leach and 
Mearns 1996: 20). The choice of the pejorative language of 
‘slash-and-burn’ to describe observed fires and cleared forest 
patches also reveals an implicit value judgement of mountain 
residents’ land use as irrational (Guha 1997), which gains 
even more explicit expression when early Carr Foundation 
reports described fire and farming techniques as ‘destructive 
forces.’ Linking into prevalent conservation and development 
narratives, assumptions about the nature and speed of 
ecological change on the mountain seemed solid and legitimate 
enough to serve as the basis to propose policies as drastic as 
‘enticing’ people to move off of their land.
Perhaps most significantly, the extreme degree of urgency 
that characterises this narrative of crisis reveals more 
about the interests of Carr Foundation leaders than it does 
about the nature of deforestation on the mountain. Emery Roe’s 
observation about the links between crisis narratives and claims 
to land and resources applies directly here:
  Crisis narratives are the primary means whereby 
development experts and the institutions for 
which they work claim rights to stewardship 
over land and resources they do not own. By 
generating and appealing to crisis narratives, 
technical experts and managers assert rights as 
‘stakeholders’ in the land and resources they say are 
under crisis. (Roe 1995: 1066)
New on the scene in Gorongosa in 2005, the Carr Foundation 
team had numerous interests at stake in highlighting the 
situation on Gorongosa Mountain as a crisis. Not only did the 
mountain offer an additional area for intervention that made 
the nascent project seem more important and necessary, but it 
also presented the possibility of enhancing the park’s attraction 
for tourists. A park without much wildlife would need special 
attractions to draw tourists far from the beaten path of eastern 
and southern African safari travel. In fact, the December 2005 
report on Gorongosa Mountain includes “loss of tourism 
potential” along with “degradation of forest cover” and 
“degradation of water supply” in a list of the “main threats to 
the mountain system” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 7-8). Accordingly, 
the Carr Foundation began promotions and preparations for 
tourist visits to the mountain as early as 2006, even before they 
gained official permission from the area’s residents (Figure 1). 
My experiences living on the southwest side of Gorongosa 
Mountain from 2006-2008 revealed a situation, which, (while 
not a utopia), was much more stable and much less dire 
than the Carr Foundation’s portrayal of crisis. Over time, 
even representations of the ‘crisis’ on the park’s website 
Figure 1
A tourist map from 2006 showing (blue dot) the Murombodzi waterfall 
(Cascata Murombodzi) on the southwestern side of the Gorongosa 
Mountain as an attraction
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have required modification. When I left the area in 2008, 
around the time that the Carr Foundation had predicted the 
ecosystem on the mountain would have “degraded to a point 
from which it is unlikely to recover” (Carr Foundation 2006: 
10), little had changed in the forest on Khanda’s portion of 
the mountain. In 2009, the Gorongosa website altered the 
timeline to place the end point of disaster at 2011. Now, the 
ominous time-oriented predictions of immanent collapse are 
absent from the website, but a tone of urgent crisis remains.17 
Environmental crisis on Gorongosa Mountain, from the 
GNP perspective, has become a protracted condition. The 
persuasive power of environmental crisis narratives is here 
visible: despite the inaccuracies of assessments of the timeline 
for ecosystem collapse on the mountain, the determination 
of the situation as one requiring outside intervention remains 
unchanged and unquestioned.
A different kind of crisis: narratives of threats to land 
tenure on the mountain
While the Carr Foundation made much of the ‘crisis’ of 
deforestation on Mount Gorongosa, most of its residents 
generated a narrative of an ominous predicament of a much 
different sort. This sense of present crisis struck me as 
overwhelming when I first returned to stay with my host family 
on Gorongosa Mountain in 2006. My first excited conversations 
with old friends were strikingly different than on my previous 
return visits. Those who knew me well told me their latest 
news, as was always the case. But rather than telling me about 
a child who was ill, the latest new-born, or the results of this 
year’s harvest, people pulled me aside to tell me with urgent 
concern that ‘Fundação Carr’18 had come and was trying to take 
their land away. Residents of all stripes shared this sentiment: 
women, men, youth, elders, church leaders, and traditional 
leaders alike. This atmosphere revealed another aspect of crisis 
narratives. Situations deemed to be urgent or pressing move 
to the forefront as a primary concern, superseding all others. 
Just as demonstrated by the Carr Foundation’s ‘Save the 
Mountain’ public campaign, crisis narratives evoke a desire for 
transmission—a desire that was also apparent when I visited 
Khanda’s régulo,19 Eugénio Almeida, shortly after my arrival. He 
too expressed an urgent sense of crisis. He spoke in a hushed tone 
about the Carr Foundation and then asked me if I had brought 
my voice recorder. Revealing a strong desire to transmit this 
narrative of crisis and his awareness of having limited access to 
channels for its spread, he said, “Turn it on… this is important.”
The régulo picked up a stick and began drawing a map of 
Gorongosa district at our feet. Pointing to the oval representing 
the mountain and tracing it all the way to the edge of the 
Pungue River he said, “From here all the way to there—all of 
this belonged to the régulos. Each régulo had their population. 
And when the Portuguese came, people were living here.” He 
pointed to the area inside the present borders of the park, saying:
 When they arrived, they encountered animals of all  
kinds. And they expelled the people… That area they 
call ‘park’—there in the park they threw out Régulo 
Chikale, Régulo Nyanguwo, Régulo Tambarara: ‘Get 
out! Get out!’20
The park’s history depicted in this narrative stands in stark 
contrast to the popular media’s narrative, which begins with the 
park’s ‘glorious past’. In the regulo’s narrative vision, restoring 
the colonial past of the park is not a positive goal. While the 
park was once splendid for wealthy leisure tourists, it was not 
so for Gorongosa’s residents. The human costs involved in the 
park’s creation were extremely high. Elder Gorongosans recall 
how colonial agents used the brutal system of taxation and 
conscripted labour to force the very residents who had been 
displaced from the present-day park to return to their former 
territory to build roads and lodging for tourists. Thus, to many 
long-term Gorongosa residents, the project to rehabilitate the 
park is re-creating, repeating and extending the negative legacy 
of the park into the present.
The Régulo paused, looked up from the map he had been 
drawing, and looked me right in the eyes. Lowering his gaze, 
he slowly moved the stick to point again at his map and said:
 Now this here is Gorongosa Mountain. [T he 
Portuguese] weren’t able to claim it—they weren’t 
able to claim the area all the way to here. But now, our 
government, because they are poor, now they want to 
put this mountain in, for all this to be included with 
Chitengo.21 But we don’t want this! We don’t want 
it! We don’t want it, we don’t want it, we don’t want 
it.22
On the mountain, where nearly all residents make their 
living from small-scale farming, land is central to political, 
economic, and social life. Political power and rights over land 
and resources are all linked to ancestral tenure—those who 
can claim to be descendants of the first settlers on Gorongosa 
Mountain are considered the present owners of the land 
(Isaacman 1972; Shipton 1994). Thus, mountain residents’ 
dominant narrative is centred around the view of long-term 
tenure and autochthony as the legitimate basis for claims to 
land and resources. 
This ancestral claim is embodied in the explicitly political 
figure of mhondoro spirits. Mhondoro—the spirits of the first 
political leaders to rule in the area—reside on the mountaintop, 
and exert ongoing political authority through well known 
regulations and prohibitions. In Gorongosa, mhondoro are 
seen as the owners of the land who, when well respected, look 
after the well-being and prosperity of their descendants (Lan 
1985; Shoko 2007). Mhondoro, and other spirits residing in 
an area must be accorded due respect, or they may show their 
disapproval by causing misfortune. Mountain residents recall 
historical moments, stretching back to pre-colonial times, when 
mhondoro spirits have intervened in times of crisis to protect 
mountain residents from outside threats.
To the residents of Gorongosa Mountain, the arrival of Greg 
Carr’s heavily financed project to rehabilitate GNP raised the 
familiar spectre of the possibility of dispossession and thereby 
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also the anger of mhondoro spirits. The unified sense of urgency 
that emerged among long-term residents of the mountain 
derives from both recent and deep historical experience with 
struggles over the most important shared source of and political 
and economic security—land. For over a century, Gorongosa 
Mountain has been a site of struggle. The mountain has been a 
place of refuge and a stronghold for groups opposing various 
forms of centralised outside governments23 (French 2009; 
Schuetze 2010). In the late colonial period, the Portuguese 
government granted a large portion of land on the Khanda 
side of the mountain to a German man to start a dairy farm. 
An enormous swath of land high on the mountain was turned 
to pasture for his cattle. Many of those displaced later worked 
on the dairy farm, but this employment and the ‘economic 
benefits’ did not compensate for the loss of land and led to 
deep-seated anger.
Following independence, displaced residents were able to 
return to their land, but the war between Frelimo and Renamo24 
soon brought land tenure to the centre of a new struggle. During 
the 16 year conflict, mountain residents were the focal point in a 
struggle over control of the population. Because Renamo troops 
had a base on the mountain and relied on residents to supply them 
with labour and basic foodstuffs, Frelimo strategy aimed to cut 
off this important support base by forcing residents into aldeias 
or ‘communal villages’ in the lowlands. Mountain residents 
were targeted in a scorched earth campaign where homes, fields 
and granaries were burnt, and goats and chickens slaughtered, 
in order to leave them with no choice but to seek refuge and 
food aid in the Frelimo protectorates. But, for many mountain 
residents, remaining on their own land was so important that 
they preferred to find a way to eke out a living on wild foods and 
by planting crops in hidden valleys, risking punishment from 
Frelimo or capture by Renamo troops who periodically raided 
homesteads to conscript people into the army. 
These past threats to land tenure coalesced into a powerful, 
shared narrative that fostered defiant attitudes against the Carr 
Foundation that were so widely shared as to be almost universal 
among mountain residents. This narrative, also informed by 
previous experiences with GNP, painted a homogenous picture 
of anyone assumed to be Carr Foundation staff as villainous 
outsiders with only nefarious intentions and a singular desire 
to force residents off their land. Colouring mountain residents’ 
interpretations of the Carr Foundation’s planned interventions, 
this narrative thus ignited resistance to park initiatives as soon 
as they were first introduced. 
Community meetings: narratives like oil and water
Unified and intense opposition to the Carr Foundation’s 
early initiatives on Gorongosa Mountain began even before 
programmed interventions were put in place. The Carr 
Foundation began its project on the mountain by convening 
several ‘community meetings’ held in the Khanda Regulado 
on the southwest slope of Gorongosa Mountain. Such meetings 
were a critical aspect of what the Carr Foundation heralded 
as “the full involvement of the communities in all aspects 
and stages of development” of interventions on the mountain 
(Beilfuss et al. 2005: 8). Following legal guidelines in the 
national land law, some of these meetings were also required 
in order to obtain the approval of the area’s residents for 
proposed land use. In the context of these meetings, the two 
crisis narratives came into conflict, but, like oil and water, they 
repelled each other and remained separate. 
At the first ‘community meeting,’ held on January 13, 2006, 
Greg Carr and other leaders of the Carr Foundation, with 
district government representatives and the then Director of 
GNP, Roberto Zolho, met with a crowd of residents of the 
Khanda region of the mountain. The meeting focused on a 
proposal to form a ‘partnership’ with the park to manage the 
land at the top of the mountain. In their speeches, park and 
government leaders shared precious few details about what 
such a partnership would entail. District government officials 
explained that the Carr Foundation had generously offered 
to manage the land on the mountain. Park representatives 
characterised the Carr Foundation’s interests as: the 
“exploration of Gorongosa Mountain” for a “joint-venture 
in ecotourism” (GTZ, PRODER 2006). They explained that 
tourists would contribute money to the Khanda community so 
their lives would improve.
After this brief presentation, attendees responded by expressing 
their concerns. The official meeting report summarised mountain 
residents’ statements in the following way: 
  …all were unanimous in affirming that they had no 
intention of forming a partnership [with the park] 
because… they had already had negative experiences 
in the past or during the colonial period, when 
many Portuguese settled in an area and then shortly 
thereafter began to impede and expulse people… 
(GTZ, PRODER 2006).
Mountain residents’ narratives, grounded in historical 
experience, shaped powerful resistance to the idea of park 
management of the land and resources, and quickly fomented 
a sense of unity in opposition to an outside threat. The Carr 
Foundation’s narrative and vision for intervention on the 
mountain, which made great sense from a social and physical 
distance, thus encountered an obstacle when placed before 
area residents for approval.
Rather than withdraw or work towards a modified, 
collaborative arrangement, project leaders concluded that 
the problem lay in local residents’ ‘misplaced’ fear of land 
loss and ignorance of the goals and values of conservation. 
The goal for Carr Foundation leaders then became to 
bring mountain residents’ understanding of the situation 
and goals for intervention into conformity with that of 
project leaders. A note appearing at the end of the official 
report of this initial meeting reads: “A weak capacity to 
understand complex issues such as this is common in the 
communities” (GTZ, PRODER 2006).25 And, in a bullet list of 
recommendations it was suggested that park staff “study other 
ways to present the issue in order to generate more interest 
in the community”(GTZ, PRODER 2006). Revealing how, 
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‘full involvement of communities’ in the project, in practice, 
referred merely to a process of consultations to gain approval 
for inflexible and predetermined schemes, the report made 
no recommendations to modify or drop the original proposal. 
Rather, a second meeting was called, one month after the first.
During this second meeting, park representatives again made 
general speeches about their proposal but added no details. 
Khanda residents again responded with impassioned speeches 
of refusal. Seeing that their answer had been ignored twice in a 
row, all the attendees stood up and walked out in protest before 
the meeting ended. This display of unity and defiance in the face 
of authority illustrates an effect of mountain residents’ crisis 
narrative. Building on habits ingrained from generations of 
living under colonial rule, rural residents of Gorongosa typically 
display a supremely diplomatic and almost submissive stance 
in formal meetings with authority figures.
This surprisingly showy and unified protest was animated 
by narratives that figured the Carr Foundation as foreign 
interlopers bent on taking land on the mountain, leading the 
meeting attendees to collectively abandon social conventions of 
deference in order to demonstrate their unified resistance. As one 
man put it: “we have known for a long time what it’s like to have 
our land taken from us. First, they speak sweet words… they 
will act like our friends today, but tomorrow, they will kick us 
to the side.”26 In meetings held in Khanda from 2006-2008, the 
narrative fortresses on either side were not breached, but rather, 
the persuasive qualities of crisis narratives shaped interpretations 
of and hardened responses to the other side’s words and actions, 
making positions quite rigid, further illustrating the power of 
divergent narratives of crisis to shape and maintain conflict.
Mhondoro narratives, unity, and resistance
Despite the opposition they encountered in these meetings, 
the Carr Foundation pushed forward with its agenda to extend 
conservation and tourism activities to the mountain. In response, 
mountain residents continued to present a unified front of 
resistance. In the eyes of mountain residents, from 2006 to 2008, 
the Carr Foundation’s actions were characterised by empty 
promises and disrespect. Slotting them into a single character 
position in their narrative, residents of Khanda saw Carr 
Foundation employees and associates as a homogeneous group, 
and felt that they were treating the mountain as their own. Despite 
their overt refusal to approve the park’s proposal to initiate 
conservation efforts on the mountain, residents watched as Carr 
Foundation employees moved forward with conservation and 
tourism schemes on their terms, ignoring traditional regulations 
governing access to sacred areas. Some park projects, such as 
the actual and planned construction of buildings and structures 
to serve tourists violate specific rules ordained by the mhondoro 
including strong prohibitions against placing buildings above 
certain elevations. These actions intensified residents’ sense of 
the threat to their land and fomented a powerful sense of unity 
and defiance that would build over time.
In 2007, the Carr Foundation hired a team of dozens of 
fiscais (fiscais=rangers) to patrol the mountainside in Khanda. 
These fiscais visited fields above 700m, imposing fines for 
cutting certain tree species and pressuring residents to plant 
tree seedlings in fields on steep slopes, immediately adjacent 
to streams, or in areas otherwise deemed to be ‘unsustainable.’ 
Mountain residents regarded the deployment of forestry rangers 
as a major affront and responded with outspoken resistance, 
leading to overt conflicts with residents of the lowlands who 
were employed as fiscais. As one man explained: “four fiscais 
came and wanted to plant trees in our garden. We refused, [and 
said to them] that if you want to plant [the trees] why don’t 
you plant them in your field?… If you want to plant them, 
go ahead, but as soon as you leave, we will pull them out.”27 
Mountain residents also watched as park staff buzzed around 
the mountainside in helicopters to travel to meetings, take 
important guests for aerial tours, or shuttle biologists back and 
forth between the mountaintop and their accommodations in 
the park. For many, the frequent roar of helicopters stirred up 
the terror of the recent war when Frelimo made aerial attacks 
on home sites in a last-ditch effort to remove any families 
who remained in hiding (Schuetze 2010). These events thus 
reinforced mountain residents’ crisis narrative, grounding the 
narrative’s early predictions in tangible signs that their land 
was under immediate threat.
The Carr Foundation’s offences touched off a flurry of stories 
of the protective actions of Mhondoro spirits—narratives 
that further strengthened mountain residents’ sense of unity 
and righteousness of autochthonous land claims. In the face 
of the Carr Foundation’s offences, one story spread like 
wildfire as proof that these spirits continue to have force. In 
late 2006, the Carr Foundation hired a ‘community liaison’ 
to manage relationships with mountain residents in Khanda. 
While visiting different mfumos (mfumos=subchiefs) near 
Nyankhukhu, this young British man set his sights on an 
impressively tall dome-shaped granite outcrop known as Bango 
Moliro, which, in Chigorongosi translates as ‘fire mountain.’ 
Seeing the landmark as an exciting place to bring tourists, he 
ignored the explicit warnings of the mfumos against visiting 
this prohibited area and climbed up to explore. Soon after, 
while driving back to the park in one of the Carr Foundation’s 
new 4x4 vehicles, he noticed smoke flowing out from under 
the hood and stopped to investigate. Before long, the car was 
consumed in flames and was destroyed completely. 
How a brand new truck with no previous engine problems 
could catch fire baffled park staff, but made complete sense 
to mountain residents, who spread the story with glee. After 
all, the young man had climbed Fire Mountain in defiance of 
the mhondoro’s prohibitions. Offended spirits were actively 
at work. 
This and other stories depicting the protective and retributive 
actions of mhondoro reveal the power of narrative to foster 
unity and defiance and a sense of moral righteousness. They 
also illustrate how Gorongosa Mountain residents’ sense of 
patrimony is much more strongly based on their land and 
ancestral political claims than with the nation or the national 
government of Mozambique. It was not long before it became 
clear to mountain residents that the national government 
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was in support of the Carr Foundation’s project, and many 
were not surprised. As one leader put it: “I’ve told you that 
the government wants money. They’ve been bought. Now, we, 
the people, are familiar with how our government works. The 
people here have no power.”28
In stark contrast to Mozambique’s central government, 
narratives figured mhondoro spirits as responsive and active in 
protecting mountain residents’ land tenure. Resistance to the 
park’s interventions on the mountain, then, also gave expression 
to resistance to the authority and legitimacy of the national 
government. The park’s expansion to Gorongosa Mountain was 
therefore deeply political, rekindling long-standing opposition to 
external centres of political power. The park’s project reaffirmed 
mountain residents’ assessment of the national government as 
an illegitimate power which acts not to protect the interests of 
the people but only to generate wealth for a limited few.
Producing destruction: narrative fortresses
When I returned to Gorongosa Mountain in June and July 
2011, I was officially entering a national park. While no signs 
indicating this park status had been posted, the park designation 
had a heavy impact on the area. What struck me most was the 
way in which communication between park leadership and 
mountain residents was so infrequent as to be nearly absent. 
Early aspirations for ‘full involvement’ of resident populations 
in the implementation of the project had been completely 
abandoned. Instead there was even tighter fortification of 
information and thicker barriers to affected residents’ real 
involvement in park planning or decision-making. Thus, 
narrative fortresses became more apparent, and more 
impermeable to change or influence. 
Throughout the early years of the project, rumours about 
park officials’ plan and actions in regards to the mountain 
circulated widely. Excluded from the planning table and 
barred from influencing the design and vision of the project’s 
initiatives from the start, mountain residents were left to fear 
the worst about the intentions of outsiders. Information shared 
at ‘community meetings’ had been overly vague and general, 
fostering fearful speculation about the park’s actual plans. This 
situation has not changed over time. Tellingly, I learned of the 
official inclusion of the upper elevations of the mountain in the 
park via an internet news article from my home in the US in 
the summer of 2010, long before the news reached mountain 
residents. It wasn’t until March 2011 that park authorities 
convened an official ‘community meeting’ in Khanda to make 
the announcement.
By the time I arrived in June 2011 it seemed that 
communication problems had worsened. Or at least the stakes 
were now higher. Upon my return to stay with my host family 
I was shocked to find that everyone seemed to be talking about 
immanent dispossession. And, I watched exchanges where 
residents living inside the new park boundaries received clear 
information from people in official positions that they should 
prepare to move their homesteads to the lowlands. These 
reports came from sources including the District Director 
of Education, the Governor of Sofala Province, and fiscais 
employed by the GRP. 
When I shared this information with leaders of the park’s new 
division set up to manage the mountain, they were dismayed 
and explained that there were no such plans in the works. The 
park project leaders’ failure to involve mountain residents 
in planning and design and, at a minimum, their failure to 
open clear lines of communication about the implications 
of the park designation, opened the way for narratives of 
impending dispossession to dominate. Such dramatic failures to 
communicate have had negative effects for all parties. Fearing 
immanent dispossession, mountain residents were altering 
plans for the immediate future, including questioning whether 
to invest in the upkeep of their property. Here, a tragic impact 
of these narrative fortresses is revealed. Without means for 
effective communication, park actors and mountain residents 
came to live in separate realities—with harmful consequences 
for mountain residents whose actions in the present and plans 
for the future were shaped by the rising fears of forced removal.
Most disturbingly, the animosity and fear of the situation 
contributed to a visible increase in deforested areas—exactly 
what the park project on the mountain aimed to halt. My return 
visit allowed me to witness how a ‘crisis’ of deforestation 
had become more palpable. In early July, I hiked around the 
mountain summit and saw large areas cleared for fields—areas 
that had been solid forest during my last visit in 2008. In 
interviews with numerous residents, I found everyone I talked 
to was well aware of the situation. Most mountain residents 
I interviewed expressed deep dismay about the people who 
were suddenly clearing fields on the mountain’s summit. The 
mountain’s summit has long been understood to be territory 
off limits to cultivation—an area where mhondoro and other 
land spirits reside. Spiritually mandated prohibitions against 
cutting trees on the summit were still strictly adhered to while 
I lived on the mountain from 2006 to 2008.
While I encountered different interpretations of the reasons 
for the transgressions, all of them were linked to a profound 
sense of powerlessness, anger, and immanent crisis. Some 
attributed these people’s actions to last-ditch efforts to 
accumulate money from potato farming to buffer the material 
devastation that would accompany removal to the lowlands. 
Others explained that transgressions were based in a sense that 
if the forests were the focus of outsiders’ interest in controlling 
the land, destroying forests might drive them away. Others 
saw it as sabotage—as a form of retribution where destroying 
forest was aimed explicitly against the park’s clear interest in 
protecting the forests—to frustrate park actors and make them 
also feel a sense of powerlessness. As one man put it, all this 
started when the park came to claim control of the land: “it’s 
almost a competition. If you want to see [deforestation], then 
that’s what we’ll do.”29
CONCLUSION
Between 2006 and 2008, the Carr Foundation’s initiatives 
on Gorongosa Mountain touched off a conflict that led to 
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a hardening of positions—the development of narrative 
fortresses—rather than creating any sort of genuinely 
collaborative efforts with area residents. As the community 
meetings and their aftermath illustrate, crisis narratives played 
a powerful role in the creation and perpetuation of this conflict. 
These narratives shaped different actors’ sense of legitimacy 
and purpose, their interpretation of events, and their actions, 
thereby serving as “a medium through which events [were] 
produced” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). Fundamentally different 
apprehensions of crisis in narratives about threats to the 
land and resources on Gorongosa Mountain and a failure 
to breach them with respectful communication or genuine 
collaboration has had negative effects on the well-being of 
residents. Locked in rigid fortresses, these divergent narratives 
of crisis intensified over time, leading actors on both sides to 
transgress moral and legal norms. By 2011, the deepening 
and intensifying conflict with GNP had catalysed dramatic 
transgressions of long-held prohibitions that give expression to 
a local conservation ethic. Crisis narratives lent actors who felt 
otherwise powerless a sense of righteousness in these actions. 
Thus, the project’s environmental crisis narratives ironically 
produced outcomes counter to the goals of conservationists. 
Expanding beyond a focus on narratives to examine the 
centrality of contrasting evaluations of ‘crisis’ offers several 
important insights. First, it reveals the deeply persuasive 
power of environmental crisis claims in conservation and 
development projects. Linking into broader circulating 
narratives, these claims quickly generate authority and 
legitimacy for rapid action despite obstacles or opposition. 
Narrating particular contexts in terms of environmental crisis 
creates the sense of necessity for intervention. Crisis-claims 
about threatened ecosystems motivate desires for urgent 
action and, drawing on a growing sense of global patrimony 
of biodiversity, they legitimate the authority for external 
intervention. Further, as Roitman notes, “crisis is posited as 
an a priori; the grounds for knowledge of crisis are neither 
questioned nor made explicit” (2013: 10). Environmental 
crisis narratives thus have a powerful and persuasive effect 
on a broader public—tapping into the power of already 
existing narratives of global environmental crisis, such 
narrative portrayals of particular contexts can lend any 
proposed interventions legitimacy without the need for 
extensive empirical evidence to substantiate claims. In the 
case of the Carr Foundation’s early efforts to extend park 
activities and governance to Gorongosa Mountain, narratives 
of environmental crisis were created in the space of a few 
months, gaining expansive ‘communicability’ (Briggs 2005) 
through the authoritative language of ecological science. 
Examining the nature and effects of crisis narratives in this 
case also helps to shed light on why the Carr Foundation’s 
initial aspirations to foster amicable relations and create 
plans for the project with the ‘full involvement’ of resident 
populations were quickly replaced by a top-down governing 
structure. This initial aspiration for partnership with Gorongosa 
residents was shaped by a larger set of structures, including 
Mozambique’s current neoliberal economic development 
strategies that encourage tourism ventures. Ecotourism is 
bolstered by narratives of ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Büscher 
and Whande 2007), which offer the satisfying illusion of 
parks as progressive forces–as correcting mistakes of harsh 
fortress conservation practices of the past. In Mozambique, 
this vision for parks is clearly expressed by Mozambique’s 
Ministry of Tourism which states its goal is to move beyond 
“past” practices when conservation areas were “planned 
and managed against people” towards a “future” when 
conservation areas will be “run with, for, and in some cases by 
local people” (MITUR 2004: 19). The centrality of tourism to 
neoliberal conservation strategies shapes the kinds of win-win 
conservation and development success story narratives 
that GNP generates. Heart warming, progressive narratives 
proliferate in order to draw socially conscious visitors, who 
are driven by a neoliberal logic of “consumptive activity” as 
environmental action (Igoe et al. 2010: 504). 
With such powerful forces promoting partnership 
relationships and joint management of protected areas with 
resident populations, what led Carr Foundation staff to so 
quickly abandon this goal? The sense of urgency, conviction, 
and righteousness that crisis evokes showed itself to be much 
more powerful than visions of undoing past wrongs and 
running conservation areas “with, for, and in some cases by 
local people” (MITUR 2004). By their very nature, crisis 
claims are judgements of a situation that lend themselves to 
rigid, fixed positions. As Roitman (2013: 3) has revealed, 
“crisis is mobilised in narrative constructions to mark 
out...moments of truth,” bolstering a sense of authoritative 
knowledge of the state of a problem and the direction needed 
for change. For the early staff of the Carr Foundation, facing 
what was deemed a crisis situation, there appeared to be no 
time or space for compromise. Thus, ‘community meetings’ on 
Gorongosa Mountain almost immediately became information 
sessions with no room for negotiation or joint decision making. 
Plans set before mountain residents for approval were carried 
out despite vocal opposition to them. Mountain residents’ 
refusal to grant the park permission for land use was subverted 
by taking the request to the national government, which issued 
a decree that officially annexed the higher elevations of the 
mountain to the existing park. 
Meanwhile, relationships between park actors, government 
representatives, and residents of affected areas of the mountain 
deteriorated, communication channels became confused and 
broken, and fears of mountain residents became heightened—
opening the way for retaliatory acts. Thus, the sense of crisis—
both for conservationists and for mountain residents alike 
intensified. This situation fuelled a spiral of conflict that later 
threatened to move toward violent outcomes, as beginning in 
2011, park staff responsible for management of the mountain 
began contemplating the potential for employing armed guards 
to protect the forests.30
The early phase of the Carr Foundation’s efforts in 
Gorongosa reveals the dangers of conservation schemes in 
a context of severe power imbalances. It reveals how, in a 
postcolonial context, interventions that impact basic rights to 
Narrative fortresses / 151
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Monday, March 14, 2016, IP: 130.58.65.20]
control land and resources gain external legitimacy through 
crisis claims and calls for urgent action as well as through 
familiar development narratives that highlight the needs 
of recipients and the benevolent intent of interventions. 
The familiarity of such apolitical narratives contributes to 
their popularity and the power that they have to cover over 
complex realities and painful conflicts. This narrative easily 
overpowers and erases the deeply political and historically 
grounded narratives of Gorongosa residents who are cut off 
from the networks of influence, power, and control enjoyed 
by park-based actors, government leaders, and conservation 
advocates. The severe power imbalance that allows only one 
narrative to circulate beyond Gorongosa further consolidates 
the legitimacy of international conservation actors to intervene 
in the area. Apolitical narratives obscure the ongoing and 
heavily political conflict that is at play in Gorongosa where 
those who have the most at stake—their land, their lives, their 
livelihood—are given the least amount of control or authority 
in park affairs. 
Where severe power imbalances foster fundamentally 
different interests in land and resources, divergent crisis 
narratives are bound to emerge. As examination of this 
case has revealed, in such circumstances, even when 
conservation and development projects aim explicitly to 
create collaborative partnerships with resident communities, 
environmental crisis narratives tend to push project leaders 
away from genuine attainment of such goals. With this in 
mind, it is the responsibility of those in positions of greater 
power to forge ways to deliberately work against dominant 
narratives and rigid assessments of crisis. Focusing on the 
power and consequences of crisis claims to generate narrative 
fortresses highlights the need for conservation actors to 
not simply consult with residents affected by conservation 
schemes, but to create structures of genuinely collaborative 
governance. It points to the need to think differently about 
conservation so that residents of a protected area can 
be respected as partners in strengthening existing land 
management practices rather than as the source of destruction 
or as objects of interventions. As the Gorongosa case reveals, 
creating, circulating, and maintaining a ‘single story’ of 
conservation and development visions through tight control 
of park governance and public image does not, in the end, 
lead to greater control over complex situations. Opening to a 
diversity of experiences, positions, and forms of knowledge 
has greater potential for breaking down narrative fortresses 
and generating more effective and more just approaches to 
land management.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research would not have been possible without the financial 
support provided by the Social Science Research Council, the 
National Science Foundation, Fulbright-Hays, and Swarthmore 
College, for which I am very grateful. I am also deeply grateful to 
the residents of Gorongosa Mountain who welcomed me into their 
homes and who devoted hours to speak with me in interviews and 
conversation. This work would also not have been possible without 
the encouragement and support of my parents, Lowell and Nancy 
Schuetze. I am also grateful to Michael Walker, Heidi Gengenbach, 
Farha Ghannam, Maya Nadkarni, Liz Braun, Todd French, Marina 
Temudo, and the anonymous reviewers who all offered very helpful 
feedback on early versions.
NOTES
1. Gregory C. Carr is an entrepreneur and philanthropist from the USA. 
He gained his fortune as co-founder in 1986 of Boston Technology, 
which sold voice mail systems to telephone companies, and as chair 
of Prodigy, an early global Internet service provider. 
2. The Carr Foundation states that its programme activities are 
“dedicated to the environment, human rights and the arts.” The 
project in Gorongosa National Park has become their primary 
focus. See: http://www.carrfoundation.org/. After 2008, The 
Carr Foundation project grew into a public-private partnership 
with the Mozambican government and numerous other partners 
(including the WWF, USAID, and numerous travel and tour 
companies) and gained the title the Gorongosa Restoration 
Project (GRP).
3. A regulado is a local political administrative area. At the time 
of this research Khanda was under the leadership of the régulo 
Eugenio Almeida Canda.
4. I regularly videoed weekly court sessions. One week, a 
‘community meeting’ convened by park officials was scheduled 
to coincide with the régulo’s weekly court. Despite the régulo’s 
requests that I be permitted to film the proceedings, park 
leadership presiding over the meeting prohibited me from 
filming.
5. In interviews published more recently, Greg Carr has been 
encouraging journalists to focus their features on the work of 
Mozambican nationals involved in the Gorongosa Restoration 
Project. In an article that appeared in Travel Africa (Watt 2010), 
Carr states, ‘the story of Gorongosa is not about Greg Carr, an 
American, going over to Mozambique to save a national park… 
Sure, a handful of foreigners showed up initially and there was some 
international intervention, but we’ve moved beyond that now…’ 
6. CBS is a major US commercial broadcast television and radio 
network.
7. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed 
on October 29, 2008.
8. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed 
on October 29, 2008. 
9. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed 
on October 29, 2008.
10. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n; Accessed 
on October 29, 2008.
11. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed 
on October 29, 2008
12. http://gorongosa.net/en/page/restoration/restoration-project. 
Accessed on July 10, 2012.
13. Greg Carr, pers. comm.; Subject, Re: Mountain; September 19, 
2005
14. Rich Beilfuss is currently President and CEO of the International 
Crane Foundation.
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15. Rich Beilfuss, pers. comm.; September 21, 2005
16. Data continues to be scant and based on little more than casual 
observations (see Walker, this issue).
17. In a recent version of the website, a phrase under a section titled 
‘YOU CAN HELP!’ states, “We need your help in this important 
campaign to protect Mount Gorongosa—one of Mozambique’s 
most treasured natural wonders—before it’s too late.” See: http://
www.gorongosa.net/en/page/save_the_mountain/restore-the-
mountain; Accessed on April 20, 2012.
18. ‘Fundação Carr’ is the Portuguese phrasing of ‘Carr Foundation’
19. Régulo is the Portuguese term used to refer to an area’s primary 
‘traditional leader’ or ‘chief.’ 
20. Interview with Eugénio Almeida; December 22, 2006.
21. Chitengo is the headquarters of GNP.
22. Interview with Eugénio Almeida; December 22, 2006.
23. The symbolic power of Gorongosa Mountain as a place of 
refuge and political opposition was renewed in Mozambique’s 
public imagination in 2012 and 2013 when Afonso Dhlakhama, 
leader of the opposition party Renamo, returned to re-establish 
a base in Casa Banana on the southeastern side of the mountain. 
This return was partly in response to mountain residents’ urgent 
requests for Renamo leaders’ protection from the threat to 
their land posed by the park’s official extension to Gorongosa 
Mountain in 2011. Beginning in 2012, this base became a center 
from which Renamo conducted military training, and made 
public critiques of and demands of the ruling Frelimo party and 
from which they launched numerous attacks in 2013.
24. Frelimo was the ruling party at independence, and Renamo 
was an opposition army funded largely by neighboring white 
minority-ruled governments in order to destabilise the newly 
formed socialist state. 
25. ‘Communities,’ here, is a term commonly used in the language of 
staff and leaders of development organisations in Mozambique to 
refer to residents of rural settlements. As Hughes has noted, the 
term has come to replace Frelimo’s use of the word ‘peasantry’ 
(Hughes 2005). Thus, the term ‘community’ is a vague concept 
whose referent invokes notions of harmony and homogeneity 
that ‘works to disguise differential abilities to access power’ 
(West 2006: 36). It is also a political and ‘spatialised’ concept 
that locates people in particular geographical areas (Smith 1992). 
26. Interview with Celestino Sacaune Canda; October 30, 2006.
27. Interviewee anonymous; November 21, 2007. 
28. Interviewee anonymous; December 22, 2006.
29. Interviewee anonymous; July 4, 2011.
30. Marty Sampson, Senior Consultant for GNP on Gorongosa 
Mountain; pers. comm., June 22, 2011.
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